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
Compromises in the History OF Advaitic Thought

BY

MM. PROF. S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI
M.A., I.E.S. (*Retired*)

THE KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI
RESEARCH INSTITUTE
MADRAS

1946



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WITH A FOREWORD

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FOREWORD

THE late Mahamahopadhyaya Professor S. Kuppaswami Sastri was one of the greatest Sankritists of our generation. While he trained a good many scholars in Samskrit learning and criticism, it is a matter of regret to those who knew the depth, extent and accuracy of his learning that he did not leave behind many publications. The Research Institute founded in his name has for one of its objects the publication of his scattered writings and lectures. In pursuance of this aim, this book on *Compromises in Advaitic Thought* is brought out. The book illustrates with a wealth of learning and critical penetration, the central characteristic of the Hindu mind, the spirit of comprehension as distinct from that of exclusion. It is this feature which has enabled the Hindu mind in the past to welcome new ideas and integrate them to the master plan of Hindu thought. When the spirit declined, our cultural progress got arrested. The revival of the spirit to-day will help us to take up and answer the challenge of modern times. Loyalty to the ancient tradition of India, Professor Kuppaswami Sastri's lectures make out, requires us to move forward, and not stand still, in the world of philosophic and religious thought.

S. RADHAKRISHNAN.

FOREWORD

The late Mahamahopadhyaya Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastri was one of the great Sankarists of our generation. While he trained a good many scholars in Sanskrit learning and criticism it is a matter of regret to those who knew the depth, extent and accuracy of his learning that he did not leave

THESE lectures were delivered by Mahamahopadhyaya Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastri as the Rao Bahadur K. Krishnaswami Rao Endowment Lectures under the auspices of the Madras University on the 16th and 17th February, 1940.

The authorities of the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute are thankful to Sri G. K. Seshagiri, son of the late Professor, for presenting to the Institute the Manuscript and Typescript copies of these lectures.

The following scholars were in charge of this publication : Professor M. Hiriyanna, Professor K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, Dr. T. R. Chintamani and Dr. V. Raghavan.

॥ ओम् शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिः ॥

COMPROMISES IN THE HISTORY OF ADVAITIC THOUGHT

FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE DAYS
OF BRAHMĀNANDA SARASVATĪ]

LECTURE I

FRIENDS,

I am thankful to the Syndicate of the Madras University for the honour they have done me by inviting me to deliver this year¹, the lectures instituted in commemoration of Dewan Bahadur K. Krishnaswami Rao. I have undertaken to lecture to you on compromises in the development of advaitic thought. There will be two lectures. In the first lecture, to-night, I propose to speak chiefly about certain typical cases of accommodation, which are worthy of notice in the course of the development of Advaitic thought during the Vedic age and the early post-Vedic age. The second lecture, which will be delivered to-morrow, will comprise two parts, the former of which will deal with the noteworthy instances of compromise during the later post-Vedic age, and the latter will suggest the lines on which all these cases of compromise may be evaluated.

¹ 1940.

Accommodation, economy, management, conformity or *compromise*—these terms stand for a pacific, conciliatory, synthesising attitude of mind, tending to differences being minimised and settled through adjustment of principles and views. As stated by John Morley,¹ “the one commanding law is that men should cling to truth and right, if the very heavens fall. In principle, this is universally accepted. To the partisans of authority and tradition it is as much a commonplace as to the partisans of the most absolute and unflinching rationalism. Yet in practice all schools alike are forced to admit the necessity of a measure of accommodation in the very interests of truth itself.” All the results of the working of the spirit of accommodation or compromise in the interests of truth would come under the category of what may be called *legitimate compromise*. Many other kinds of accommodation, resting mainly on the “paramount wisdom of counting the narrow, immediate, and personal expediency” and making chiefly for individual gain in the shape of immediate material benefit or emotional gratification are of the sordid type of what may be called *illegitimate compromise*.

It would be of great interest and value to study the various results of accommodation in the development of Advaitic thought through the different ages of intellectual life, which, for the sake of convenience, may be described as the *early Vedic period*, the *later Vedic period*, *mainly the age of the Upaniṣads*, the *pre-*

¹ Morley: “On Compromise,” pp. 3-5, Eversley edn.

Śaṅkara stage in the post-Vedic age, including the epic and purāṇic ages, the *age of Śaṅkara*, the *early post-Śaṅkara period*, down to the end of the eleventh century A.D., and the *later post-Śaṅkara period*, from Śrī Harṣa (twelfth century A.D.) down to Brahmānanda Sarasvatī (circa eighteenth century A.D.). In this kind of study, the demands of historical criticism would require some attention being paid to the more prominent types, at least, of accommodative or compromising suppression of Advaita and secession from it.

The early Vedic period.—During this period, the progress of philosophical thinking along the groove of Advaitic thought may be taken to have reached its culminating point in the *monistic absolute* boldly intuited by some Ṛgvedic seers in the well-known verses:—
 “Reality is the One, whom the wise call by many names, Agni, Yama, and Mātariśvan”

“एकं सद्विप्रा बहुधा वदन्ति

अग्निं यमं मातरिश्वानमाहुः ।” (I-164-46).

“That one breathed, windless, by its own power”.

“आनीदवातं स्वधया तदेकम् ” (X-129-2).

To attempt to read into these old verses of the Ṛgveda the Advaitic theory in its finished form, with the concept of the One Absolute Existent as the real *substratum* (Adhiṣṭhāna) of the whole phenomenal world of names and forms (*nāmarūpātma-ka-prapañca*) and of *Māyā*, as the incomprehensible matrix of the world, would become easily liable to the charge of

anachronism. However, with a little stretch of imagination, one might find in the two hymns—R.V. I, 164 and X. 129—read together, an unmistakable foreshadowing of vacillation, unintentional or otherwise, in the process of thinking—that kind of vacillation which generally precedes *accommodations* emerging from conflicts of mutually impingent factors—such as the *One*, to which thinking inherently tends and the *many* which thinking inherently shuns. “Darkness was in the beginning hidden by darkness; indistinguishable, this all was water. That, which, coming into being, was covered with the void, that One arose through the power of heat.” X. 129-3.

तम आसीत्तमसा गूहळमग्रेऽ-

प्रकेतं सलिलं सर्वमा इदम् ।

तुच्छेयान्म्वपिहितं यदासीत्

तपसस्तन्महिना जायतैकम् ॥ X-129-3.

Pursuing this line of thought, it would be scarcely difficult to realise the accommodative significance of the expression ‘call variously’ (*bahudhā vadanti*) in the former verse from the first Maṇḍala, while it would be certainly difficult to miss the compromise sought to be effectuated between the original *One* and the originated *many* through *tamas* (darkness) and *tucchya* (non-existent or void)—two concepts lending themselves to equation, as Sāyaṇa points out, with the positive entity of *nescience* which is neither existent nor non-existent and described in later Advaitic works as *sadasadvilakṣaṇa-bhāvarūpājñāna*.

That the spirit of compromise was perhaps the dominating feature of all types of religious and philosophical thinking in the Ṛgvedic age is not at all difficult to maintain. In fact, this would be a very reasonable thesis to put forward, seeing how, as Prof. Max Muller pointed out, the accommodative vacillation in the religion of the Ṛgveda was constantly manifesting itself in the *henotheistic* exaltations of different deities, in the course of progress towards *monotheism*, *pantheism* and *monism*, and considering how the Ṛgveda-saṁhitā strikes a highly significant note in the concluding hymn, in the verse, “*Samgacchadhvam, samvādadhvam, sam vō manāṁsi jānatām*”, ‘Meet together, talk together (in an accommodative spirit, so as to give and take, to live and let live) and may your mind apprehend (the truth) alike.’ It is noteworthy that the central concept of *samvāda* in this verse, as opposed to *vivāda*, comprises the spirit of compromise, as one of its essential components, and perhaps, in this way, by encouraging an ever-increasing stress on *samvāda*, *sampratipatti*, *parasparabhāvanā*—mutual adjustment, mutual regard and mutual concession, in the sphere of thinking, speaking and doing (*manas*, *vāk*, *kāya*):—thus, perhaps, it is that, all through the ages, the cultural life of India has been growing, with its distinctive features of *absorption*, *tolerance*, *synthesis* and *accommodation*. We may be forcefully reminded at this stage of what Manu—one of our oldest lawgivers—has said about the accommodation of *satya* with *priya*—of what is true with what is agreeable, beautiful and good.

सत्यं ब्रूयात् प्रियं ब्रूयान्न ब्रूयात् सत्यमप्रियम् ।

प्रियं च नानृतं ब्रूयादेष धर्मः सनातनः ॥

Manusmṛiti IV, 138.

This great maxim deserves to be amplified fully in a discourse on compromise; and such amplifications, as are relevant, are reserved for the latter part of the second lecture in connection with the evaluation of the different kinds of compromise adverted to.

Later Vedic period—The age of the Upaniṣads. Some alien scholars, well-intentioned and known for their thoroughness, have attempted to study the Upaniṣads and find out their dominating theme, without giving due weight to the traditions of Indian thought, which form the background of the Upaniṣads. The results of this kind of study, even in the case of the earlier group of Upaniṣads constituting the basic Śrutis on which the whole structure of the Vedānta-darśana rests, such as the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and the Chāndogya, are found embodied in two propositions:—that the fundamental part of the Upaniṣads is all thaumaturgy, and that all the vedāntic Upaniṣads, in the form in which they are available to us, are illogical strings of *disjecta membra*, belonging to different types of thought and different stages of development and any effort to find unity of thought in any of the vedāntic Upaniṣads or to discover their dominating theme would be merely ploughing the sands. These two propositions have not found any encouragement at the hands of Indian scholars and have been viewed with strong disfavour, parti-

cularly by those scholars, Indian as well as foreign, who have carefully studied the vedāntic Upaniṣads, in the light of such aspects of the cultural traditions of India as deserve due consideration in the interpretation of ancient Indian texts. The best and the most thorough going exposition of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, with special reference to the original texts and the traditional culture of India, that has so far been undertaken and successfully completed by any foreign scholar is what Dr. Deussen has given to the world in his treatise on the philosophy of the Upaniṣads. Many Indian scholars who are sufficiently familiar with Dr. Deussen's works would readily acclaim Dr. Deussen as one of the greatest Śāṅkarites of the modern world, who happens to be clothed in Kantian garb by the accident of birth. With a remarkably high degree of perspicacity, Dr. Deussen rightly lays hold of the principle of accommodation, which has been freely and frequently used by later vedāntist teachers in explaining many a clash or hitch in the process of vedāntic thinking and points out that "the idea of accommodation becomes a key which is fitted to unlock the secrets not only of the doctrinal developments of the Upaniṣads, but of many analogous phenomena in Western philosophy."¹ An important limitation of this accommodation theory is, as Dr. Deussen points out, that the accommodative adjustments may have been unintentional in many cases; and in many,

¹ See page ix of the author's preface—English translation of Deussen's work—"The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads".

others, as an attempt at a fair evaluation of them will reveal, it must be remembered that they are believed to be necessary and legitimate, though intentional.

A few typical instances of accommodative adjustments in the Upaniṣads may now be considered. Upaniṣadic thought uses two brief mystical formulas—“*Amṛtam satyena channam*” (Bṛh. I, vi, 3)—“the immortal (Brahman) veiled by the (empirical) reality;” and “*Satyasya satyam*” (Bṛh. II, vii, 6)—“the reality of reality”. Such formulas are frequently employed by Yājñavalkya and many other Upaniṣadic teachers. In such formulas, the working of the accommodative spirit is plainly discernible in applying the term *satya* (reality) to the empirical world of plurality revealed by experiential knowledge as contrasted with the “reality of reality” (*Satyasya satyam*), while, in fact, *Brahman* or *Ātman* is the only reality. In accommodative formulas of this type, one may easily find the source of the compromise adopted by later Vedāntists in all their explanations in which they draw a distinction between phenomenal or empirical reality (*vyāvahārika-sattā*) and absolute reality (*pāramārthika-sattā*).

The earliest Upaniṣads, the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and the Chāndogya, describe Brahman as the *One, incomprehensible, absolute reality*, and the later Upaniṣads amplify this description in poetic style by means of paradoxes suggesting a negation of all empirical attributes. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka text—“*Athāta ādeśo neti neti*” (II, iii, 6) directly conveys the incomprehensibility of Brahman. Nevertheless, all the Upaniṣads are very particular

about equating Brahman with *Being* (*sat*), *Consciousness* (*cit*) and *Bliss* (*ānanda*). The Bṛhadāraṇyaka text "*Vijñānam ānandam Brahma* (Bṛh. III, ix, 28) and the Taittirīya text "*Satyam jñānam anantam*" (Taittirīya, II. 1) are too well known to need any special amplification. In these two texts, one can easily find the source of the later formula—*Saccidānanda-rūpam Brahma*, so often repeated in later texts as well as popular parlance that it has become a common practice in Hindu society to use it (*saccidānanda*) as a proper name. The Upaniṣads are all emphatic about the incomprehensibility of Brahman; however, the process of thought and exposition adopted by great Upaniṣadic teachers like Yājñavalkya is often constrained to use positive terms like *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* and thereby accommodate itself to the inveterate habit of thinking in positive terms, which the human mind has formed. In considering the accommodative process involved in the idea behind the formula—*saccidānanda*, a shrewd philosophical critic may also pause, by the way, to admire the farsightedness of Upaniṣadic philosophers in equating Brahman not merely with *cit* but with *sat* and *ānanda*. In this connection, Dr. Deussen regretfully remarks "that the philosophising spirit of mankind in India, Greece and modern times has, with remarkable unanimity, fallen into an error, which we can most briefly describe by the word *intellectualism*".¹

¹ See p. 132, "*The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*" by Deussen—English translation.

This criticism overlooks the fact that *sat* in the Upaniṣadic thought, as Dr. Deussen himself has repeatedly pointed out, comprehends the whole province of reality, the outer world as well as the inner nature of man. If the advaitic Absolute were equated with consciousness (*cit*) alone, the Advaita doctrine would have easily come within the ambit of the charge of cold intellectualism. But Yājñavalkya and other Upaniṣadic philosophers describe *cit* as ‘the light of lights, (*jyōtiṣām jyotiḥ*: (Gītā, xiii, 17) *svayam jyotiḥ puruṣaḥ*, (Br. up. iv. iii. 9), and the concept of *cit* in the *saccidānanda* equation stands hemmed in between the existential and emotional aspects of reality (*sat* and *ānanda*) and thus merged in the highest peak of advaitic synthesis, *viz.*, *saccidānanda-rūpa-brahman*.

Every careful student of the chief vedāntic Upaniṣads is apt to be strongly impressed with the type of accommodation which has found a sufficiently prominent place for the pantheistic mode of thinking in the Upaniṣadic thought ‘without abandoning the fundamental idealistic principle, by conceding the reality of the manifold universe, but at the same time maintaining that this manifold universe is in reality Brahman (*Sarvam khalvidam Brahma*—Chānd. III, xiv. 1). Here, idealism accommodates itself to the realistic view of the world and presents itself as *pantheism*.¹ It would be interesting to note how the empirical category of causa-

¹ Cf. Deussen’s *Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, 159—162 335—361, 398—405.

lity is introduced to remove the obscurity felt in the nature of the relation of *identity* between *Ātman* and *Universe*, how in a later stage, represented by the *Śvetāśvatara* and *Mahānārāyaṇa*, the supreme and individual souls appear in marked contrast with each other, and theism emerges in a *definite* form and accommodates itself to the earlier types of thought—*advaitic* idealism and pantheism.

The original form of the doctrine of emancipation (*mukti*), as it appeared in the earliest Upaniṣads, is that the intuitive knowledge of *Ātman* is itself emancipation. Strictly speaking, in its original form, *mukti* in the *advaitic* sense is only *Jīvanmukti* and it is not a becoming something. The Kāṭha text—*vimuktaśca vimucyate* (V. 1) throws a flood of light on the manner in which the later contrast between *mukti* before the cessation of corporeal existence (*Jīvanmukti*) and final deliverance after the cessation of corporeal existence (*videhamukti*), arose and grew from the Upaniṣadic accommodation of the *advaitic* truth of *Ātman* being eternally *mukta* to the empirical way of fancying *Ātman* as *becoming a mukta*; and this kind of compromise with empirical modes of thinking led to the formation of eschatological theories, like the theory of the way of the gods (*deva-yāna*), on which the *muktas* were led after death through a series of attractive intermediate stages to union with Brahman.

In the *early post-Vedic stage*, the *epic and purāṇic ages* evolved numerous interesting compromises in the sphere of religion and philosophy. The greatest monu-

ment of the spirit of accommodation and compromise, viewed as one of the most potent of the factors contributing to the conservation, continuity and growth of Hinduism, is the *Bhagavad-gītā*. The *Gītā* is called a Yoga-śāstra chiefly because its preponderant note is a synthesis of all the ways of spiritual life, with their shifting emphasis laid alternately on true insight (*jñāna*), genuine devotion (*bhakti*) and dedicated service (*karma*), through all legitimate types of compromise. If the workings of the spirit of accommodation in the sphere of the religion of the R̥gveda could be summed up in the novel term '*Henotheism*' brought into vogue by Professor Max Muller, similar accommodative processes may be described by the term '*Henopatism*',¹ signifying an accommodative synthesis of diverse ways of living leading to the final goal. The most telling type of compromise, which the *Gītā* teaches between the highest type of *jñāna* and the numerous kinds of *karma* which a person has to do is found incorporated in verses 11 to 26 in Chapter III. Three striking ideas, which may be of great value, or principles underlying certain important, useful and legitimate types of compromise, emerge from these verses:—the need for giving and taking (*paraspara-bhāvanā*); adherence to the established ways of the world with a view to its orderly maintenance and healthy advancement (*loka-saṁgraha*); avoidance of a revolutionary unsettlement of

¹ Heis (hen) Gk. = One; Patos. = Gk. = (Cf. Pathi, Panthāḥ, —Skt.) = Bridge.

the minds of the ignorant and lifting them up by setting a healthy and feasible example in one's own conduct.

देवान् भावयतानेन ते देवा भावयन्तु वः ।

परस्परं भावयन्तः श्रेयः परमवाप्स्यथ ॥ 3-11

“With this shall ye cherish the gods, and the gods shall cherish you. Thus cherishing one another, ye will obtain the highest good.”

कर्मणैव हि संसिद्धिमास्थिता जनकादयः ।

लोकसंग्रहमेवापि संपश्यन्कर्तुमर्हसि ॥ 3-20

“It is by works alone that men like Janaka became blest; and works thou shouldst also do with a view to maintaining the world.”

यद्यदाचरति श्रेष्ठस्तत्तदेवेतरो जनः ।

स यत्प्रमाणं कुरुते लोकस्तदनुवर्तते ॥ 3-21

“Whatever a great man does, the same is done by others as well. He sets up a standard and it is followed by the world.”

सक्ताः कर्मण्यविद्वांसो यथा कुर्वन्ति भारत ।

कुर्याद्विद्वांस्तथासक्तश्चिकीर्षुर्लोकसंग्रहम् ॥ 3-25

“As ignorant men act from attachment to their work, O Bharata, so too should an enlightened man act, but without any attachment, so that he may maintain the order of the world.”

न बुद्धिभेदं जनयेदज्ञानां कर्मसङ्गिनाम् ।

जोषयेत्सर्वकर्माणि विद्वान्युक्तः समाचरन् ॥ 3-26

“ Let no enlightened man unsettle the minds of the ignorant, who are attached to their work. Himself doing all works, with faith, he should make others do so as well.”

In these verses, a careful thinker cannot miss the excellent accommodative device, which Śrī Bhagavān Kṛṣṇa has furnished in the shape of ‘selfless work in a spirit of dedication’, whenever one’s mind happens to be agitated over the collision between the ideal of right conduct and the *trans-moral, advaitic* ideal of self-realisation (*ātma-jñāna*), as taught in the Hindu scriptures.

The *Śrīmad-bhāgavata* is the greatest monument of compromise, typifying the developments distinctive of the later stages of the Purāṇic age. In this Purāṇa, there is a clear elevation of the ideal of *bhakti-yoga* and an equally clear endeavour to adjust it to the Advaita ideal of *jñāna* and the Advaita doctrine of identity between *Brahman* and *jīva* (God and man). Attention is solicited in this connection to these two verses extracted from the *Śrīmad-bhāgavata*.

“ या निर्वृतिस्तनुभृतां तव पादपद्म-

ध्यानाद्भवज्जनकथाश्रवणेन वा स्यात् ।

सा ब्रह्मणि स्वमाहिमन्यपि नाथ मा भूत्

किं त्वन्तकासिलुलितात्पततां विमानात् ॥

[श्रीभागवते ध्रुवस्तुतौ ।]

IV. ix. II.

नैवात्मनः प्रभुरयं निजलाभपूर्णो

मानं जनादविदुषः करुणो वृणीते ।

यद्यज्जनो भगवते विदधीत मानं

तच्चात्मने प्रतिमुखस्य यथा मुखश्रीः ॥

[श्रीभागवते प्रह्लादस्तुतौ ।]

VII. ix. 10.

In the former of the two extracts, devotion to Kṛṣṇa is exalted above the realisation of the advaitic *Brahman*. In the latter, the advaitic theory of *jīva* being the reflection (*pratibimba*) of *Īśvara* (viewed as *bimba*) is used in explaining the idea that a worshipper is really worshipping himself by worshipping God.

LECTURE II

The former part of this lecture will be devoted to a brief account of the compromises which are associated with the names of Bādarāyaṇa, Jaimini, Bhartṛprapañca, Brahmadatta, Kumārila, Prabhākara, Gauḍapāda and Maṇḍanamīśra, representing the pre-Śaṅkara stage in the development of Advaita during the later post-Vedic period; those which are advocated by Śaṅkara, Padmāpāda, Vācaspati, Udayana, Vimuktātman, Sarvajñātman, Ānandabodha and Śrī Harṣa; those which are found incorporated in the systems of Rāmānuja and Madhva; and lastly, those compromises which are found advocated by Vijñānabhikṣu, Appayyadīkṣita, Madhusūdanasarasvatī and Brahmānandasarasvatī. The latter part of this lecture will endeavour to give a brief estimate of these compromises.

BADARAYANA AND JAIMINI.—Bādarāyaṇa and Jaimini are the earliest systematic and authoritative exponents of the principles of exegesis, as applicable to the *Jñāna-kāṇḍa* and the *Karma-kāṇḍa* of the Veda. According to some later Advaitins like Sureśvara (see *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, p. 52), Bādarāyaṇa and Jaimini were both of them Brahma-vādin and old Advaitins. They provided Indian exegesis with highly elastic principles of interpretation which were all developed round the pivotal principle of thought-unity or sentence-unity—the *samanvaya* of the *Brahmasūtras* and the *eka-vākyatā* of the *Karma-mīmāṃsā-sūtras*; and they

were perhaps satisfied that the accommodative processes resulting from a wide use of the principles of *samanvaya* and *eka-vākyatā* by competent thinkers would eventually lead to the establishment of the Advaita doctrine, together with all the admissible ways of compromise. Bādarāyaṇa and Jaimini themselves would appear to have exercised a wise reticence in respect of their own philosophical convictions. Perhaps they believed that philosophical thinking and the quest for truth would gain immensely by their Sūtras being so composed as to admit of use by several *bhāṣyakāras* in support of Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita.

PRAPANCAPRAVILAYA-VADA.—A careful examination of the Upaniṣads would reveal that many a gentle and acceptable device came to be adopted as transitional adaptations for facilitating the shifting of stress in thought and conduct from the ritualism of the Brāhmaṇas to the Upaniṣadic doctrine of self-realisation. One of those devices is the association of a suitable meditative process with some appropriate *karma* or *karmāṅga*, so that the karma itself may be gradually replaced by a suitable mental process—*dhyāna* or *jñāna*.

There are references in the works of Śaṅkara¹ Sureśvara and later writers, which show that in the pre-Śaṅkara stage, groups of philosophers called *prapañcapravilaya-vādinah* and *kāma-pradhvaṁsa-vādinah* arose.² Their method is a somewhat forced accommo-

¹ E. g. Śaṅkara on *Vedānta Sūtra*, III, ii, 21,

² See Prof. M. Hiriyanna, J.O.R., Madras, Vol. I, pp. 109—116.

dation between the ritualistic sections of the Veda known as *karma-kāṇḍa* and the Upaniṣads forming the *jñāna-kāṇḍa*. They sought to subordinate the whole ritualistic scheme to *jñāna*, by putting forward the negative view that every injunction or prohibition in the *karma-kāṇḍa* is intended to keep a person engaged in a particular act so that he might eliminate the rest and avoid yielding to impulses of various kinds and sublimate his self gradually and realise its true nature as transcending the world (*niṣprapañca*). This view called *prapañca-pravilaya-vāda* is found set forth and criticised by Śaṅkara and post-Śaṅkara Vedāntins, and it is specifically ascribed to an old school of Advaitins, *Jaranmāyāvādinah*, as Sudarśanabhaṭṭa describes them.¹ The whole spirit of the *prapañca-pravilaya-vāda* may be embodied in a telling epigram like this:—

“*Ay is otherwise nay, to get at is to forego, to do is to forbear, and to enjoy is to cloy.*”

Numerous accommodative processes of the nature of *adhyāropa* (supposititious make-shift) and *apavāda* (eventual elimination of make-shifts by outgrowing them) were advocated in the Upaniṣads in teaching Advaita and came to be crystallised in post-Upaniṣadic Advaita in the oft-quoted dictum—

अध्यारोपापवादाभ्यां निष्प्रपञ्चं प्रपञ्चयते ।

Though it may be quite legitimate to attempt to familiarise thought with the acosmic (*niṣprapañca*)

¹ Śrutaprakāśikā on I. i. 4.

aspect of Brahman, by a series of unobjectionable *adhyāropas*, the accommodation in the *prapañca-pravilaya* theory did not find favour with the majority of Vedāntins, chiefly on account of the obvious risk of a moral bankruptcy or chaos, which could be justly apprehended as a very probable consequence of the practical applications of that theory in life.

BHATTA KUMARILA, the leading exponent of the Bhāṭṭa school, and PRABHAKARA, with whose name the Prābhākara school is prominently associated, were both of them well-disposed to the Advaita doctrine and give indications of their preference for that doctrine, in their works—the *Ślokavārttika*, the *Tantravārttika* and the *Bṛhatī*. Prabhākara's observations, in the concluding part of the *ātma-vāda* in his *Bṛhatī*, are very significant in this connection. It is clear that Prabhākara believes in the soundness of the advaitic theory of *adhyāsa* and also in the soundness of the admonition conveyed in the Gita text “*Na buddhibhedam janayed ajnānām karmasaṅginām*”

यदुक्तम्—“अहंकारममकारावनात्मन्यात्माभिमानौ” इति मृदितकषायाणामेवैतत् कथनीयम्, न कर्मसङ्गिनामित्युपरम्यते । आह च भगवान् द्वैपायनः “न बुद्धिभेदं जनयेदज्ञानां कर्मसङ्गिनाम्” इति रहस्याधिकारे ।

(Madras University edition of *Bṛhatī*, p. 256). Prabhākara's attitude towards the advaitic theory of *adhyāsa*, and *ātman* as the only reality is typical of the pro-Advaita bent of the early Mīmāṃsakas who would not hesitate to go to the length of suppression and

accommodation, in those cases where adequate justification could be found for these processes in the interests of Advaitic truth and in the environment of the people to whom that truth had to be taught.

BHARTṚPRAPAṆCA and BRAHMADATTA, who belonged to the pre-Śaṅkara stage in the history of Advaita, lost their nerve in their allegiance to Advaita. Bhartṛprapaṇca's views regarding the advaitic theory are available in the references found in the works of Śaṅkara and Sureśvara. The post-Śaṅkara survivals of Bhartṛprapaṇca's views are used by Bhāskara in his *bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtras*.¹ Bhartṛprapaṇca found handy the convenient and highly accommodative concept of *difference-cum-identity* (*bhedābheda*) which had already been introduced in philosophical thinking and proceeded to build up a monistic scheme of unity in which *Brahman*, *Jīva* and the *world* found their place as different entities, without abandoning the reality of any of them. The compromise of *bhedābheda-vāda* adopted by Bhartṛprapaṇca led ultimately to his secession from the acosmic form of Advaita and to the formation of a special group of *bhedābheda-vādins* of whom Bhāskara was the most prominent in the post-Śaṅkara stage.

BRAHMADATTA was a pre-Śaṅkara Advaitin, who was very particular about the adjustments which should be effected between the advaitic ideal of *Brahman*-

¹ For instance on *Vedānta Sūtras*, I, i, 4. and II, i, 13. See also Prof. P. N. Srinivasacharya: *The Philosophy of Bhedābheda*.

realisation and the discipline of *karma*. He attempted to effect the needed compromise by his *dhyāna-niyoga-vāda* and *samuccaya-vāda*. According to him, *Jīva* originates from Brahman and gets absorbed in it at the time of liberation; the final liberation is achieved by a co-ordination of *karma* with *jñāna* and through the contemplation of *Jīva* as identical with Brahman; and the central teaching of the Upaniṣads is to be found in the injunctions requiring the constant meditation of *Jīva* as Brahman, till the end of life.¹

Among the pre-Śaṅkara Advaitins, GAUDAPADA and MANDANAMIŚRA are the most outstanding thinkers representing the Advaita doctrine as it stood before Śaṅkara. Gauḍapāda has developed an aspect of the Advaita doctrine which lent itself readily to being used as the basis of the Śaṅkara form of Advaita. Maṇḍanamīśra's exposition of the Advaita doctrine, in so far as it could be studied in the *Brahmasiddhi*, preserved the fundamental part of the Upaniṣadic Advaita and advocated some noteworthy compromises with non-advaitic modes of thought. Though Maṇḍanamīśra is one of the elder contemporaries of Śaṅkara, the heritage of pre-Śaṅkara compromises which he advocates in his work, would make it more appropriate to refer to him as a pre-Śaṅkara Advaitin.

Gauḍapāda has placed himself on the highest peak, of Advaitic thought and has declared the highest truth in the *Kārikā*

¹ See Prof. M. Hiriyanna's article "Brahmadatta, an Old Vedāntin", in J.O.R., Madras, Vol. II, pp. 1—9.

न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिः न बद्धो न च साधकः ।

न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥

II-32.

“No dissolution; no origination; none in bondage; none disciplining himself towards release; none seeking release; and likewise, none becoming released—this is the great truth.” Still, in his *Kārikā*, he sees the need for accommodating his great intuition of Advaita with what he regards as *sattarka*, sound reasoning, and adjusts himself, at every important stage of his exposition, to the requirements of rationalism, and points out how the highest acme of harmony, which he calls *avirodha-yoga*, *avivāda-yoga*, *nirvānda-yoga*, *advaya-yoga*, *amatva-yoga*, can be realised only in the Advaitic scheme of thought and life. Only a true Advaitin can afford to adopt and advocate the most far-reaching type of compromise without any risk to truth and any disadvantage to the ordinary world:—

स्वसिद्धान्तव्यवस्थासु द्वैतिनो निश्चिता दृढम् ।

परस्परं विरुद्धयन्ते तैरयं न विरुद्धयते ॥

III-17.

Two of the verses in the concluding portion of Gauḍa-pāda's *Kārikā* are full of significance in more than one direction:

अजे साम्ये तु ये केचिद् भविष्यन्ति सुनिश्चिताः ।

ते हि लोके महाज्ञानाः तच्च लोको न गाहते ॥

IV-95.

दुर्दर्शमतिगम्भीरमजं साम्यं विशारदम् ।

बुद्धा पदमनानात्वं नमस्कुर्मो यथाबलम् ॥

1V-100.

In these two verses, Gauḍapāda indicates how the highest peak of advaitic thought is too high to be reached by ordinary people, and even a great gifted soul like Gauḍapāda cannot stand long on this height and has to get down to lower levels to accommodate himself to ordinary ways of thinking and speaking. Gauḍapāda says “*Namaskurmo yathābalam*”. *Namaskāra* to *nir-guṇabrahman*—the attributeless absolute—presupposes accommodation; the expression *yathābalam* (according to strength) clearly refers to the need for varying the modes of adjustment according to the requirements of the thinkers concerned.

Of the pre-Śaṅkara Vedāntins who continued to be active thinkers as elder contemporaries of Śaṅkara, Maṇḍanamiśra is the most prominent. He inherited the Upaniṣadic tradition of Advaita along with the ideas associated with the Śabdādvaita mode of Advaitic thought, advocated by Vaiyākaraṇa philosophers like Bhartṛhari. Maṇḍanamiśra adopts and advocates certain valuable compromises in advaitic epistemology, advaitic ontology and advaitic ethics. In Maṇḍana's opinion, the *anyathā-khyāti* or the *viparīta-khyāti* of the Bhāṭṭas should for all practical purposes be accepted; and when the nature of the object of erroneous cognition is examined, this theory has to be reduced inevitably to a form in which it becomes hardly distinguishable from

the *anirvacanīya-khyāti* of the Advaitins. He definitely argues in favour of the view that the *Jīva* should be regarded as the locus of *avidyā* (nescience), which obscures the true nature of *Brahman* and thus has *Brahman* as its object (*viśaya*); and in doing this, he clearly accommodates himself to the prevailing theistic sentiment against the view that *Brahman* is both the *āśraya* and *viśaya* of *avidyā*. Maṇḍana maintains what is known in Advaitic literature as the doctrine of *prasaiṅkhyāna* and holds that the indirect knowledge of *Brahman*, arising from texts like *tat tvam asi* should pass through the furnace of meditation (*upāsanā*) before the detractive and recessive elements of relation and mediacy could be removed from it, and before it could be refined into the pure, efficient and direct realisation of the Absolute Real (*Brahma-sākṣātkāra*). Here, Maṇḍana is accommodating himself to the common view that *śabda* can generate only an indirect cognition having a relational content. Maṇḍana's name has come to be prominently associated with *bhāvādvaita* ('ens-monism'), not so much for the reason that he considers *avidyā-dhvaṁsa* to be a real factor, as for the marked manner in which he stresses the reality of *prapañcābhāva* in the concluding part of his *Brahmasiddhi* (p. 157) and emphatically declares it to form the final and otherwise unascertainable import of Vedāntic texts. Herein a discerning student of Advaita may easily see Maṇḍana's readiness to compromise with Dvaita, where absolutely necessary. In fact, two famous Dvaita writers—the authors of the *Nyāyāmṛta* and of the *Taraṅgiṇī*—have

brought out the significance of this accommodation by equating *bhāvādvaita* with what may be called *abhāva-dvaita*.¹ Again Maṇḍana is prepared to accept Bhartrhari's *śabdādvaita* in so far as it does not come into conflict with the *brahmādvaita* for which he himself stands. Maṇḍana rejects Śaṅkara's view about the antithesis between *karma* and *jñāna* and gives his own verdict in favour of a certain type of *jñāna-karma-samuccaya* in which *karma*, in the form of *agnihotra* and such other sacrifices or at least in the form of meditation, has an important place and function in the final stage of the causal scheme necessary to bring about Brahman-realisation. In the concluding part of his work, *Brahmasiddhi*, Maṇḍana points out, in an accommodative spirit, how vedāntic texts may be linked with purposeful activity (*pravṛtti*) by taking into account the *pravṛtti* in the direction of the meditation necessary for transforming the indirect verbal cognition arising from the *mahāvākyas*, into direct *Brahman-realisation*.

SAMKARA, the greatest of Advaita teachers has confined himself in his works to certain very legitimate types of accommodation for which one could find adequate support in the Upaniṣads. In his brilliant statement of the theory of *adhyāsa*, he clearly shows how the recognition of *ajñāna* or nescience as a beginningless, indefinable, positive entity is the least objectionable solution for all the difficulties felt by philosophers in bringing together *the one* and *the many*, *reality* and *non-reality*, *Brahman* and *prapañca*, *satya* and *anṛta*.

¹ See Nyāyāmṛta I. 23. p. 198; Cf. also IV. 1.

He realises clearly that the differences revealed in experience cannot be all reduced to nullity, and that they cannot be as real as Brahman or ātman—the reality of reality (*satyasya satyam*) spoken of in the Upaniṣads. He utilises effectively this upaniṣadic suggestion by recognising a contrast, purely tentative as it may be in Advaitic thought, between absolute reality (*pāramārthika-sattā*) and relative reality (*vyāvahārika-sattā*). He has developed this type of compromise in his works in such a way that the adverse comments usually made by certain thinkers on the Śāṅkarite scheme of thought might lose their force on scrutiny. Repeatedly he emphasises the idea that the world is *mithyā* only in the sense that it is *anirvacanīya*. For all practical purposes in life, the world is as important to Śāṅkara as to anybody else. The very first expression that he uses in his monumental *bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtras* is a strong evidence in favour of his readiness to make all reasonable concessions to the realist ways of thinking. Further, in his minor works especially, as also in his *bhāṣyas*, he has definitely indicated the limits within which accommodation to the theistic sentiment would be sufficiently warranted in Advaitic thought. The distinction between *para-vidyā* (Brahman-realisation) and *aparavidyā*, as represented by all forms of knowledge within the empirical sphere tending to the achievement of the goal of *para-vidyā*, which has its root in the Upaniṣads themselves (cf. *Praśna Up.*, v. 2), is, in Śāṅkara's opinion, the most comprehensive type of legitimate compromise with the realist and pluralist

ways of thinking that advaitic thought may justly allow. In the sphere of ethical discipline the only kind of accommodation which Śaṅkara considers reasonable is what is implied in the *sādhana-catustaya* scheme, namely that while *karma* may be given the place of greatest importance at the door of even the innermost shrine of advaitic truth, *karma* in no sense should be co-ordinated with *jñāna*.

According to Śaṅkara and Sureśvara, a *jīvanmukta* may continue to live and re-incarnate himself in many a corporeal form through the force of his fructified *karma* and may attain to *kaivalya* either on the fall of the body in which he has come by Brahman-realisation or may don other corporeal forms till his fructified *karma* is exhausted. And in this way of describing a *jīvanmukta*, Śaṅkara has found a means of continued service in society for those who have reached the pinnacle of knowledge. Maṇḍana, however, is not prepared to go as far as Śaṅkara in regard to the doctrine of *jīvanmukti* and would make a Brahman-knower, functioning in society, strictly limited to the fall of the body in which he has come by Brahman-knowledge. In regard to *sannyāsa*, again, Śaṅkara and Sureśvara hold that *sannyāsa-āśrama* is a better way of reaching the highest goal, than the *gr̥hasthāśrama*. Maṇḍana, in this matter, accommodates himself more to the common run of mankind and views *gārhaṣṭhya* as providing a quicker method than *sannyāsa*, for reaching the highest goal, and Maṇḍana's chief ground is that there is full

scope for having knowledge implemented by dedicated or selfless work in the life of a householder.

Among Śaṅkara's disciples, PADMAPADA is less unaccommodative than SURESVARA. The former perpetuates the spirit of accommodative reasonableness of his great master, while the latter, in most of his works shows himself to be rather over-zealous in preserving strictly the integrity of advaitic thought. One has only to be invited to consider in this connection the following two typical extracts:—

आनन्दो विषयानुभवः नित्यत्वं चेति सन्ति धर्माः अपृथक्त्वेऽपि
चैतन्यात् पृथगिवावभासन्ते ।

Pañcapādikā. p. 4, Vizianagaram Series,

अद्धातममनादस्य प्रमाणं सदसीति ये ।

बुभुत्सन्तोऽन्यतः कुर्युस्तेऽक्ष्णापि रसवेदनम् ॥

Naiṣkarmyasiddhi, III. 117.

नूनं ते नासिकाग्रेण वीक्षन्ते सूर्यमण्डलम् ।

Bṛhadāraṇyaka-vārttika, p. 735, verse 1521.

It would be obvious from the first of these extracts that Padmapāda is a very reasonable accommodationist, adjusting the requirements of realism, pluralism and Advaitism wherever there is a need to do so. From the latter extracts it would be equally obvious how cavalierly uncompromising Sureśvara's attitude is.

With regard to VACASPATIMISRA, it would be enough to say that he carries Maṇḍana's accommodativeness to the length of effecting a merger, as far as possible, in Śaṅkara's view. It may also be noted in

this connection that Vācaspatimiśra has amplified in his *Bhāmatī*, Maṇḍana's epistemological attitude by clearly showing how *anirvacanīya-khyāti* emerges from a critical review of the theories of *asatkhyāti*, *akhyāti* and *anyathākhyāti*.

SARVAJNATMAMUNI of the 10th century, who was a close follower of Sureśvara, though not a disciple as generally believed, is far less unaccommodative in his attitude than the latter. The most striking type of accommodation which he commends to an Advaitin, relates to causality. If space and time furnished the bricks of the empirical wall separating the 'reality of reality' from the world of empirical reality, causation may well be described as forming its foundational structure. It may be said to be one of the highest types of accommodative spirit in the sphere of Advaita to view the three theories of causality *ārambha-vāda*, *pariṇāma-vāda* and *vivarta-vāda*—as the three steps of the ladder through which thought has to rise to the highest metaphysical peak represented by the one absolute *Brahman*, the lowest rung being the creationistic view, the next higher step being the transformationistic view, and the the highest step being the transfigurationistic view. This verse from the *Samkṣepaśārīraka* deserves to be noted and remembered in this connection.

विवर्तवादस्य हि पूर्वभूमिः वेदान्तवादे परिणामवादः ।

व्यवस्थितेऽस्मिन् परिणामवादे स्वयं समायाति विवर्तवादः ॥

II-61.

See also II-70.

VIMUKTATMAN, the author of the *Iṣṭa-siddhi* is far less accommodative than either Maṇḍana or Vācaspatimiśra. The doctrine of Māyā as expounded by Śaṅkara and his immediate followers is amplified as the main theme of his work by Vimuktātman, and this doctrine is rounded off with the view that *avidyā-nivṛtti* is neither *sat* nor *asat* nor *both* nor *anirvacanīya*, but a something of the fifth variety. In this view, one may find a clever way in which an advaitic dialectician may accommodate himself to a non-advaitic one.

UDAYANA is treated by Brahmānandasarasvatī¹ as an Advaitin at heart and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises produced by Udayana should be regarded merely as counterblasts to the Buddhist tenets of idealism and nihilism. Some of Udayana's statements in his *Āmatattvavivēka*,

बलिनि वेदनये जयश्रीः ।

सा चावस्था न हेया मोक्षनगरगोपुरायमाणत्वात् ।²

where he refers to Advaita, justify Brahmānanda's view. Udayana's accommodative concern for the *vyāvahārika* world must have made him suppress his own Advaitic conviction.

ANANDBODHA has simply maintained the accommodative level of Śaṅkara and abandoned some of the compromises introduced by Maṇḍana and adopted by Vācaspati.

¹ See pp. 226-30, Anantakrishna Sastri's edn. of the *Advaita siddhi*.

² See *Āmatattvavivēka*, Chowkhamba edn., pp. 230 and 451.

SRI HARSA'S *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādyā* is a full vindication from a polemical viewpoint of all the possibilities and limits of compromise which Śaṅkara's Advaita may allow, with reference to the world of empirical reality. The inexhaustible resources which an Advaitin may command in the direction of accommodation with realist ways of thinking, through the concept of *anirvacanīyatva* are fully described in the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādyā*. In the rationalistic sphere of enquiry, according to Śrī Harṣa, *anirvacanīyatva-vāda* and the absolute one-ness of *cit* as recognised by the Advaitins are the only two admissible things; and nothing else would bear scrutiny.¹ Even Śrī Harṣa in *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādyā* when he places himself on the level of a non-combative, pacific teacher of great truths, becomes very soft and pliable under the influence of the accommodative spirit which he inherited from early advaitic tradition, and points out that the discipline of *bhakti* is generally necessary for ordinary people as an important step leading to the advaitic goal.²

In the history of Vedāntic thought there are two groups of teachers who seceded from Advaita. One group is headed by RAMANUJA who is solicitous to accommodate his way of monistic thinking on the one side to pluralistic realism, and on the other, to advaitic monism. The crowning achievement of this group is typified in the denomination *Viśiṣṭādvaita* which has

¹ See *Brahmānandīya*, p. 225.

² See *Siddhāntabinduṭīkā*, verse 8.

been accepted as the most significant name that could be given to Rāmānuja's school of Vedānta.

अशेषचिदचिदात्मकशरीरविशिष्टस्य शरीरिणोऽद्वैतम् ।

Unity of God as the inner spirit, quickening the whole universe, which bears to Him the same relation that the body of an individual bears to the embodied *Jīva*. Through the idea that Brahman is the inner self of the *Jīva* and the material world, Rāmānuja seeks to safeguard the claims of non-dualism and dualism. In the final state of release, Rāmānuja recognises the possibility of a *mukta-jīva* realising *Brahmānanda*. As Appayya Dīkṣita has pointed out,¹ this is in the direction of compromise with the Advaitin's doctrine and if pressed further, would only result in the recognition of the identity of the *Jīva* with Brahman. It is easy to see how this result would follow. One's *ānanda* cannot, for obvious reasons, be experienced by another.

Another group of seceders from Advaita, showing a somewhat unaccommodative attitude, is headed by the strongest and the boldest of India, viz. MADHVACARYA. As Appayya Dīkṣita himself points out, even the Dvaita mode of thinking cannot entirely shake off its leanings in favour of Advaita. This may be seen in the manner in which what the Dvaitins call *sanmukti* would entitle a *sanmukta* to become absorbed into the body of Nārāyaṇa and to experience all His delights through His *indriyas*.²

¹ In his *Ānandalaharī*, Bharati Mandiram Sanskrit Series, p. 146.

² *Ibid.* pp. 145—6 and Madhvācārya's *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* IV. iv. 5.

¹APPAYYA DIKSITA, the renowned polymath of the sixteenth century, has clearly shown in his *Ānandalahari* how the advaitic scheme of thought and discipline may be accommodated completely to the viśiṣṭādvaitic scheme through the device of treating *saguna-brahman* as the intermediate purport (*avāntara-tātparya*) of vedāntic texts, and *nirguṇa-brahman* as the ultimate purport. Only his pre-established Śaiva obsessions have made him restrict this kind of accommodation to the Viśiṣṭādvaita thought in the Śrīkaṇṭha-bhāṣya and unwilling to extend it to the teachings of the Śrībhāṣya.

MADHUSUDANA SARASVATI AND BRAHMANANDA SARASVATI are the greatest champions of Advaita dialectics. Madhusūdana seeks to harmonise all the systems of thought and religion through the great accommodative device of difference in fitness (*adhikāra-bheda*) and rounds off the ladder theory put forward by Sarvajñātman.

सर्वेषां च संक्षेपेण त्रिविध एव प्रस्थानभेदः । तत्र आरम्भ-
वाद एकः, परिणामवादो द्वितीयः, विवर्तवादस्तृतीयः ।....सर्वेषां प्रस्थान-
कर्तृणां मुनीनां विवर्तवादपर्यवसानेन अद्वितीये परमेश्वरे एव प्रतिपाद्ये
तात्पर्यम् । न हि ते मुनयो भ्रान्ताः, सर्वज्ञत्वात्तेषाम् । किन्तु
बहिर्विषयप्रवणानामापाततः पुरुषार्थे प्रवेशो न संभवतीति नास्तिक्य-
वारणाय तैः प्रकारभेदाः प्रदर्शिताः ।

(*Prasthānabheda*, p. 10. Ānandāśrama edn.)

¹ Here the late Professor had proposed to add a paragraph about VIJÑANABHIKSU.

Having perched himself high on the advaitic peak of *nirākāra-vāda*, Madhusūdanasarasvatī feels nervous, and his thought seeks emotional comfort in giving vent to his *bhakti* impulse in the famous verse he composed at the end of the *nirākāra-vāda* section of the *Advaita-siddhi*.

वंशीविभूषितकरान्नवनीरदाभात्
पीताम्बरादरुणविम्बफलाधरोष्ठात् ।
पूर्णेन्दुसुन्दरमुखादरविन्दनेत्रात्
कृष्णात्परं किमपि तत्त्वमहं न जाने ॥

(p. 750).

Further, he considers it perfectly legitimate to effect a compromise between the *bhakti* ideal as presented in the *Gītā* and the *Bhāgavata* with the advaitic ideal of Brahman-realisation. This harmonious adjustment he secures through the account he has given of *bhakti* as the highest *rasa*, in his famous work called the *Bhakti-rasāyana*. And in this connection, he naturally presses into his service the pliable text of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* रसा वै सः ¹. Within the sphere of the advaitic school of Vedāntins, Madhusūdanasarasvatī prefers to show a high degree of accommodativeness to the views of accommodative Advaitins like Maṇḍana and Vācaspati, as well as the uncompromising Advaitins of the type of Sureśvara. Brahmānandasarasvatī mostly endorses Madhusūdanasarasvatī's views and develops

¹ Bhagavadbhaktirasāyana, Achyutagranthamālā edn., Benares, III. 22-24, pp. 142-4.

further some of the accommodative theories. In this connection, Brahmānanda's amplification of Maṇḍana's *bhāvādvaita* and justification of it deserve attention. (p. 326). In regard to some matters like *jīvanmukti*, Brahmānanda is not so accommodative as Madhusūdana or Śaṅkara himself. (*Brahmānandīya* pp. 252, 255).

So far we have been considering various instances of compromise in the history of advaitic thought. It would be difficult to decide which of them are wholly legitimate and which wholly illegitimate. As John Morley¹ has pointed out, a wise suspense in forming opinions, a wise reserve in expressing them, and a wise tardiness in trying to realise them—these are the three provinces of compromise, and they should be differentiated carefully “from unavowed disingenuousness and self-illusion, from voluntary dissimulation and from indolence and pusillanimity”. It should also be pointed out here that there is a fourth distinction which Deussen has pointed out, though omitted by Morley; and it is unintentional accommodation as distinguished from intentional accommodation. And all the three distinctions pointed out by Morley come under the category of intentional accommodation. The quest for truth is a very complex process of thinking and most of the accommodative devices which thought itself spontaneously introduces should generally be considered legitimate and unintentional, even in cases where such accommodative devices result from the

¹ “On compromise”, pp. 4, 88.

exhaustion of the rationalistic resources, after all possible effort.

Some difficulty arises particularly in the pleas for compromise implied in the Gītā theory of *loka-saṁgraha* and in the idea of *provisional usefulness* advocated by the author of the *Prasthānabheda* through his ladder theory. Hume says "It is putting too great a respect on the vulgar and their superstitions to pique one's self on sincerity with regard to them.....I wish it were still in my power to be a hypocrite in this particular." Morley criticises Hume's attitude and describes it as a revolting case of moral improbity and soul-less cynicism. What would Morley say to Bhagavān Kṛṣṇa's plea of *loka-saṁgraha*? Certainly he would approve of it, if he believes, like most of us, that the teacher of the Gītā knows everything about what contributes to individual and social well-being, and he would not certainly regard it as a case of voluntary dissimulation or an instance of indolence and pusillanimity. In evaluating the instances of intentional compromise described in these lectures, it would be useful to remember the distinction between what may be called a courageous compromise and what may be called a timid compromise. For instance, in estimating the compromise for which Maṇḍana is responsible, it may be pointed out that in adopting a reasonable compromise with the Mīmāṃsakas by assigning to *karma* and *upāsana* their due place in his scheme of Brahman-realisation, Maṇḍana has shown a rare courage by fearlessly preferring to remain a sweetly reasonable,

accommodative and eclectic type of Advaitin, not caring for the plaudits he might have gained by following Śaṅkara closely.

One word more. The boundaries of compromise are set clearly by Manu in his memorable dictum *satyam brūyāt*, etc. The interests of truth can never be sacrificed to what is *priya*, what is good and beautiful and helpful. In the sphere of thought, word and deed, truth must be maintained at all costs. All legitimate concessions that can possibly be made whenever there is a clash between what is true and what is good and agreeable must be made, and it must always be remembered that in determining what is *satya* and what is *priya*, the society as a whole matters as much as the individual concerned. I cannot more appropriately wind up these lectures than by quoting again Manu's words with the two emendations which I would like to make for *brūyāt*, namely, *kuryāt* and *dhyāyet*.

सत्यं ब्रूयात्प्रियं ब्रूयान्न ब्रूयात्सत्यमप्रियम् ।

प्रियं च नानृतं ब्रूयादेष धर्मस्सनातनः ॥

सत्यं कुर्यात्प्रियं कुर्यान्न कुर्यात्सत्यमप्रियम् ।

प्रियं च नानृतं कुर्यादेष धर्मस्सनातनः ॥

सत्यं ध्यायेत्प्रियं ध्यायेन्न ध्यायेत्सत्यमप्रियम् ।

प्रियं च नानृतं ध्यायेदेष धर्मस्सनातनः ॥

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